Нов български университет

Eleonora Naxidou

 

 

Introduction

 

The Bulgarian Văzraždane was nationally oriented from its onset.[1] Political aspirations, however, did not come to the fore until after 1860, at a time when the national movement started to adopt more dynamic perspectives. At first, the main object was the construction and consolidation of a distinct Bulgarian ethnic character by pursuing activities such as the creation of schools, the instruction of the Bulgarian language, the publication of newspapers and journals, the study of Bulgarian history, ethnology, linguistics etc., and in this way, seeking Bulgarian cultural differentiation from the other Balkan peoples.[2] The initial cultural expressions were soon followed by appeals for ecclesiastical rights, which after the end of the Crimean War (1856) culminated in a fight for emancipation from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which was the church authority the Bulgarians adhered to.[3] This endeavour to form an autocephalous church on a national basis, which can be described as ‘ecclesiastical nationalism’, was mainly undertaken by the Bulgarian national leadership within the Ottoman empire among which the community of Constantinople played a prominent role. Meanwhile, apart from supporting the ecclesiastical programme, the Bulgarian colonies in Serbia, and primarily Romania, also expressed ‘political nationalism’, in that they promoted initiatives aimed at the political independence of the Bulgarians, whether through revolutionary or peaceful means.[4] However, their primary concern was to organize and put into practice effectual methods to achieve liberation. More specifically, their uppermost intention was to create the most suitable conditions to instigate a successful uprising; they paid much less attention to building a political system for the independent Bulgarian nation-state that would be created in the future.[5]

The purpose of this paper is to deal with the political orientations of the Bulgarian intelligentsia of the Văzraždane, focusing on Ljuben Karavelov’s plan for Balkan co-operation as a means to discard Ottoman rule in the European territories, and for the establishment of a Balkan federation in which each nation would participate on equal terms. The political and ideological background that relates to Karavelov’s thinking is also considered so as to provide a better insight of his ideas and the circumstances in which these were born.

 

2. Background

The notion of Balkan collaboration at the revolutionary level, which was to a large extent unofficially promoted, arose very early in the 19th century, soon after the emergence of the Balkan national movements that strove for liberation from the ‘Ottoman yoke’. Local rebellions were, thus, supported by members of other ethnic groups; for example, Bulgarians, Serbians, Montenegrins etc fought on the side of the Greeks in the War of Independence.[6] In addition, plans had been drawn up for uprisings to break out simultaneously in different areas. Such was the intention of the Greek ‘Filiki Etaireia’ (Society of Friends) founded in Odessa in 1814 - to prepare a widespread insurrection of all the Balkan peoples.[7] With this purpose in mind, its members came into contact with the Serbian liberation leaders. In addition, they collaborated with Tudor Vladimirescu in the Danubian Pricipalities, before triggering the revolution in the Peloponnese in 1821.[8] Despite the fact that all attempts for common action proved practically unsuccessful, they were never wholly abandoned until the fate of the Balkan territories had finally been settled. Instead, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries attempts were made to form military alliances among the Balkan nation-states against the Ottoman Empire.

Although the initiatives for common revolutionary action came from within, i.e., it was the Balkan peoples themselves who instigated the various rebellious activities, the idea of political unification in the form of an Eastern or Balkan federation was first introduced outside the Balkans.[9] It was brought up as one of the options for settling the Eastern Question at the onset of the 19th century, but in effect had very little impact and no practical significance. Expressed by a few individuals -diplomats, intellectuals, publicists and revolutionaries- both in Eastern and Western Europe at different times and under different circumstances, it comprised an assortment of proposals, which were of a rather general and somewhat vague character rather than consisting of any concrete, detailed plans that were meant for implementation. Besides, never was there any real political influence nor was this prospect taken seriously into account as having the capacity to form a realistic policy to arrange the political future of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

There was suggestion about the creation of some kind of Russian dominated Eastern federation made in the Memorandum entitled ‘For the re-arrangement of Europe in the event of the combination which was then being projected against Napoleon proving successful’ which was composed in 1804 by the Pole, Prince Adam Czartoryski, in his capacity as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.[10] According to Czartoryski, Turkey should be left intact, but if it ever came to the question of arranging the future of the Ottoman Empire ‘the mass of the Turkish territories in Europe should be divided into separate States, governed locally, and bound to each other by a federation, upon which Russia would be able to secure to herself a decisive and lawful influence by means of the title of Emperor or Protector of the Slavs of the East which would be accorded to his Imperial Majesty’.[11] However, there was no mention in the memorandum as to who the participants would be.

A more specific proposal was put to the Russians on the occasion of the Russo-Turkish war of 1828 by another diplomat, John Capodistrias who had by then already been elected president of Greece. He foresaw a federation of five states in the former territories of European Turkey: the Danubian Principalities, Serbia with Bosnia and Bulgaria, Macedonia with Thrace, Epirus with Albania, and Greece. Each would be governed by a European prince, whereas Constantinople was to be a free city and the seat of the federal congress.[12]

A Slavic union, which would also include the non-Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe lay at the core of the political programme of some Russian Panslavists, such as Danilevski and Fadieev in the 1860’s. According to Danilevskii, who elaborated such a plan in his book Russia and Europe (1869), the Slavic federation under Russian supremacy would consist of eight units: the Russian Empire, six kingdoms -those of the Czechs-Moravians-Slovaks, the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes, the Bulgarians, the Romanians, the Hellenes, and the Magyars- and the district of Constantinople.[13]

Visions of a federation also originated in Western Europe. In his two-volume book ‘Les Slaves de Turquie’ published in Paris in 1844, Cyprien Robert envisaged the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and its transformation into a political unity consisting of two confederations under the rule of the sultan: one Christian or ‘Greco-Slave’ in the European territories, and one Muslim in Asia. In his opinion, such a re-organization was the only way to guarantee the integrity of Ottoman dominion and at the same time prevent the ‘Greco-Slaves’ being absorbed into the Russian Empire.[14] He claimed that the first step in the establishment of the ‘Greco-Slave’ amphictyony’ should be a Bulgaro-Serbian union, which would protect Constantinople against the Russians and prepare the ground for the new political status of the European and the Asiatic peoples of the Ottoman Empire.[15]

The model of a federal unification of Eastern Europe was also favoured by certain Italian revolutionaries. The Venetian Marco Antonio Canini proposed the formation of the ‘United States of the East’ made up of a Danubian and a Byzantine confederation[16] with allied French and Italian intervention in order to hinder Russian expansionism.[17] Giuseppe Mazzini also believed that only a federation in Eastern Europe could serve as a barrier to Russian aspirations in the area, although he was inconclusive as to the exact nature of such a political scheme.[18] In his Slavic Letters, published in 1857, he suggested the foundation of a Yugoslav state including Serbia, Carinthia, Croatia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Bulgaria, whereas in 1866, he opted for the replacement of the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire by a Danubian and a Slavo-Hellenic confederation both allied to Italy.[19]

In the 1850’s another ‘federal version’ came to the fore which was not merely an individual’s suggestion but was discussed by political and revolutionary leaders: the unification of the Hungarians, the Yugoslavs and the Romanians into a Danubian federation aimed against Austrian domination in Central Europe. Although numerous contacts among the three interested parties were made, it was impossible for them to reach an agreement.[20]

The federal organization of the Slavs was also propagated by some Russian left-wing thinkers, initiating a left -socialist and later communist- tradition, which included federalism in the context of a general political and socio-economic reformation. Alexander Herzen declared himself in favour of the transformation of Russia into a democratic federation of equal partners which would embrace all Slavs.[21] The Russian anarchist and revolutionary Michael Bakunin, in Foundations of the New Slav Policy, where his views expressed at the Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848 were published in the press, advocated for a Slav Federation based on the principles of the French Revolution -equality, freedom and brotherly love. The observation of these basic rules was entrusted to the ‘Slav Council’, the supreme organ of the political unity also responsible for settling disputes among the union members and handling relations with non-Slavic peoples.[22]

Besides Karavelov, the federal idea was adopted by Balkan intellectuals and revolutionaries in the 1860’s, such as Svetozar Markovich along with certain Serbian radicals who combined federalism with socialism.[23] In his work Serbia and the East (1872), Markovich called for revolution and unification of the Balkan peoples: ‘The Serbian people have no other way out but revolution in the Balkan Peninsula that would end in the destruction of all the states that today obstruct the unification of the Balkan nations as free peoples and workers with equal rights, as a federation of communes - districts - states- as benefits them best.’[24]

 

3. Karavelov’s plans for a Balkan federation

In the first place, Karavelov belongs to those ardent adherents who promoted a common understanding between the Balkan peoples. This idea was already popular among the members of the Bulgarian Diaspora engaged in the national cause and favoring revolutionary activities for the achievement of political independence. The majority shared the conviction that their aims could not be accomplished without foreign aid. Therefore, they were inclined towards collaboration with other Balkan peoples, namely the Serbians, Greeks and Romanians. For example, Georgi Rakovski, an outstanding figure of the Revival, advocated Balkan co-operation as early as 1841, when he organized an unsuccessful Greek-Bulgarian revolt in Braila; yet, all his contacts with the Greeks and Serbians after that proved fruitless.[25]

     Karavelov expanded the idea to incorporate political unification in the form of federation. He started developing his plan in 1867-1868 during his stay in Belgrade at a time when the efforts for Balkan communication aimed at a united confrontation against the Ottomans were gaining popularity with encouragement from the Russians. The main instigator of such a policy was the Serbian prince Michael Obrenovich, who having managed to conclude alliances with Montenegro, Greece and Romania also came to an agreement with the Bulgarians.[26] In 1867, the Bulgarian Benevolent Society[27] proposed a plan, with Russian instructions, for the creation of a Serbo-Bulgarian (or Bulgaro-Serbian) state that would be under the rule of the Obrenovich dynasty, which was fully approved by the Serbian government. A few months later, in April 1867, the proposal was discussed and adopted with some alterations by an assembly of Bulgarian delegates from Bulgaria, Macedonia and Thrace that convened in Bucharest. The new state was to be named Yugoslavia, while Thrace and Macedonia would be included in the Bulgarian section. The resolution was then passed on to the Serbians, who although agreeing with it, refrained from signing, thus putting paid to any further action of its enforcement, let alone its accomplishment.[28]

     Karavelov, who had just moved from Moscow[29] to Belgrade must certainly have been aware of the Serbo-Bulgarian understanding and the terms submitted by the Bulgarians, but he did not openly take a stance on such a prospect. In the articles published in Russian newspapers, in his capacity as a correspondent, it is evident that he did not really approve it, but nor did he reject it. His reservations were mainly due to the following reasons: (i) he was opposed to the assumption of Prince Michael Obrenovich’s supreme power, whom he criticized for his autocratic methods of governance. He accused the prince of not respecting the will of his people, of not accepting a National Assembly, of having anti-Russian inclinations and of being subject to Western, and especially French influences.[30] Hence, Karavelov affiliated himself with the Serbian Youth (Omladina) and the Opposition to the Prince;[31] and (ii) he conceived the unification of the Bulgarians and the Serbians strictly on federal basis and as the first step in the broader context of the creation of a Southern-Slavic federation.

     During that same period, Karavelov elaborated and publicized his own proposal. In June 1867, he wrote that the Bulgarians had lost their faith in the Western civilized world and realized that they must turn to Russia or Serbia for help. He added that Serbia was obliged to support them actively and forget their old disputes and contentions (about in whose veins flowed most Slavic blood, or whose history was older, or who was more powerful in the past, etc). He asserted that it was in their common interest to understand that neither the Serbians nor the Bulgarians could exist the one without the other, convinced that the establishment of two separate states would once again lead to strifes and cause new disasters. Karavelov’s further claims were that the united South Slavs should place themselves under the protection of Russia and that the liberated Serbia, apart from being the centre of the future Yugoslavia, should also become the common homeland for Serbs, Bulgarians, Croats, Montenegrins, and probably even the Czechs[32]. For him it was the duty of the South Slavs to form a free federal state, because only such a mighty political organization which had close and brotherly relations with Russia, could confront the Western Powers and the Ottomans who wanted to exploit and keep them enslaved. Karavelov, however, was doubtful that Serbia recognised the full extent of her mission.[33]

     A short while later, he noted that it was then an opportune time for the South Slavs to liberate themselves easily from the Turks as the latter’s power having diminished, they were in a very weak position. However, this could only be achieved on condition that the Slavic peoples reached a mutual understanding, which, regrettably was likely to be impeded by their historical traditions, i.e. the fact that in the past they had had separate states. Karavelov was convinced that the South and Western Slavs should overlook their past history or if possible, profit from it in order to make a new start. Their mutual aim should be unification and the creation of a Slavic federation. He admitted that it was unfortunate that very few Slavs understood fully what was in their best interest. He also criticized the Serbian government of indifference to the insurrection that broke out in Bulgaria and for being interested only in Serbian internal political affairs.[34] ‘This is our situation, these are the progressive people, to whom we put our hopes in’[35] he commented bitterly. Karavelov called all the Slavs who were in favor of a federation to take up arms and participate in a common uprising: ‘Let us hoist the Slavic flag and make Europe respect us; let us tell everyone that we are not rams to be sold’. Otherwise, Karavelov concluded, they would fall for good and never rise again.[36]

     In March 1868, Karavelov maintained that Serbia was in no position to attempt to liberate the Christians of the Balkans, either on its own or in conjunction with others, not only because it was short of guns and gunpowder, but also because it did not have sufficient internal power. Moreover, he sharply criticized the autocracy of the Serbian regime stating that while the Bulgarians, the Bosniacs and the Herzegovinians were ready to die for freedom, they were not willing to do so just to have the Turkish tyrant replaced by a Serbian one. He was also convinced that the Serbian government was unfavourably disposed to Russia.[37]

Besides the theoretical aspects of the federation, Karavelov was also interested in the practical matter of its mode of governance. In his writings he proposed that the Bulgarians and the Serbians should form a free federal state whose government would ensure the individual liberty and the national rights of all its people. This would mean that the Serbs, the Bulgarians and quite likely, the Romanians, the Greeks, and others, would have their own judiciary systems which would be in accordance with their moral and national traditions, their own schools and literature, and their own representatives in the Supreme Parliament to the complete satisfaction of each nation. Karavelov remarked that the Serbs and the Bulgarians had a wrong impression about the real meaning of freedom. Freedom was not to abolish the Turkish or German tyrants and substitute them with national leaders who had the same absolutist outlook and conduct. Karavelov’s conviction was that the government should exist for the sake of the people and not the reverse.[38] He concluded that the motto on the front of the U.S, Great Seal -E Pluribus Unum-[39] should be adopted by the Balkan peoples, because history required that they should be united and not divided. Moreover, he was convinced that the South-Slavic federation could materialize only if national leaders awoke the national conscience.[40]

At the start of 1869, Karavelov was still thinking on the matter of who should comprise the participants of his federation. For him it was clear that not only the Serbians, the Bosnians, the Herzegovinians and the Montenegrins, but also the Slavs of the Habsburg Empire should form one section of the federation. On this account, he attempted to illustrate that the Serbs and Croats were in essence one nation despite their religious differences, as in modern times these had lost their importance and could be resolved. He further asserted that they should both come to terms with the fact that they simply spoke different dialects of the same language, and should, therefore, adopt a common alphabet and unite their literature.[41] Karavelov affirmed that the South Slavs were democratic and could live together with all other peoples who shared the same principles. Making reference then to the other Balkan nations, i.e. the Albanians, the Romanians, and the Greeks, he went on to elucidate his opinion. The first he excluded on account of their culture and political life being still in a ‘period of infancy’.[42] As far as the Romanians were concerned, he believed that they clearly understood their situation and they were ready to approach the Slavs for co-operation. As for the Greeks, according to Karavelov, they had the completely unrealistic aspiration to re-establish the Byzantine Empire. What was more, they had a very low estimation of the Bulgarians and considered them unworthy of independence. Nevertheless, Karavelov was prepared to overlook these faults and leave open the question of their participation in the federation.[43]

Soon afterwards in an article entitled ‘Moi Bratia’ (My Brothers), Karavelov declared that both the Romanians and the Greeks were welcome in the federation. ‘No, brothers, leave everything aside and search for brotherhood among yourselves and among your brothers who also suffer the same way as we do. Bulgarians, Serbians, Romanians and Greeks must now give a brotherly hand to one another and unite their powers to liberate their homelands, if each of us wants to gain freedom.’[44] Karavelov emphasized that the enmities on account of the ecclesiastical conflict between the Bulgarians and the Greeks should be burried in order for them to concentrate on the common cause. The issue could be settled later, when both nations had been freed. Karavelov pointed to the fact that the Bulgarians were in dispute with the Greek Phanariot hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and not with the Greek people, who had also seceded from the Patriarchate and had themselves formed a separate Church. Historical rights, he stressed, were no longer of any real importance. Lastly, he claimed that human happiness was found not in monarchy but in liberty, as the examples of Switzerland and North America showed. Elaborating, he said that the Swiss and the American peoples were the happiest in the world, notwithstanding the fact that Switzerland was inhabited by three different nationalities: the Germans, Italians and French, who had little in common; and that America was the country of ‘fifty peoples and fifty religions’.[45] In 1869 Karavelov named his union the Danubian Federation so that it more precisely corresponded to its expansion to include other peoples beyond the Slavs.[46]

Meanwhile, Karavelov settled in Bucharest (1869-1874), where he continued, at least until the end of 1872, to fervently propagate his federal vision even though he was well aware that it was very difficult to accomplish. In October of 1871, he noted with disappointment: ‘And what has the great Slavic race or at least the Southwestern Slavs been doing until now? Here it is. Serbia has striven against its internal enemies, the Bulgarians have declared their subordination to the Sultan,[47] the Serbo-Croats of Austria fighting against each other have co-operated at one time with the Magyars at another with the Germans, wondering whether the German or the Magyar yoke was heavier;’[48] Despite everything, however, Karavelov did not lose faith and called unceasingly for unification against the common enemy.

In regards to the Greeks, Karavelov wavered about their participation in the federation, which is evident from the articles he wrote in the newspapers Svoboda and Nezavisimost.[49] This vascillation was due to, on the one hand, the refusal of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to grant the Bulgarians ecclesiastical independence, and on the other, to the Greek-Bulgarian dispute over the future distribution of the territories of Macedonia and Thrace.

Consequently, Karavelov did not always list the Greeks among the members of his union, and when their name was mentioned, it was in some cases, put in parentheses. For example, in December 1870 he wrote ‘our natural brothers, allies and friends are only the Serbians, the Montenegrins, the Croatians, the Bosniacs, the Herzegovinians and the Romanians (and the Greeks? Who knows)’.[50] In the spring of 1871, expounding once again, the main principles of his programme, he stated that ‘The Serbians, Bulgarians, Croatians, Slovenes, Romanians (and Greeks) should make-up a solid liberal federation, in which every race should have its own internal self-government, its own schools and laws; simultaneously, however, it should have a supreme parliament and a central government’.[51]

In spite of his doubts, the Bulgarian intellectual until the end of 1872, insisted on offering the Greeks a place in his multi-national political organisation. In the spring of that year, he called on both the Greeks and the Bulgarians to settle their disputes and to jointly contribute to the creation of the Danubian Federation, which he claimed, was a unique opportunity for their common salvation. This could be achieved only on condition that the Greeks reached an understanding with their otherwise ‘loathsome’ South Slavic neighbours. They would thus have to acknowledge the Bulgarians’ aspirations to acquire ecclesiastical independence, and their territorial claims, while at the same time abandon their dream to re-establish the Byzantine Empire. The Bulgarians on their part, should forgive the erring of the Phanariots, forget the past, and reach out to those Greeks, who were honest and unbiased towards them.[52]

In the above-mentioned article Karavelov for the first time made reference to the issue of the leadership of the Danubian federation. He stated categorically that the supreme authority would consist of members of all the participating nations and that the supreme leader would be the person who most deserved this position, meaning whoever successfully carried through the operation of solving the Eastern Question.[53]

A few days later, Karavelov elaborated further on his plan, stating specific details regarding the territorial dominion of each of the member-states of the federation following the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the Hungarian kingdom. More specifically, he proposed that Bulgaria, Macedonia and Thrace formed one part; Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Old Serbia, Banat, Syrmia and Banska another part; Romania would unite with Transylvania, Erdel and eastern Banat; Greece would acquire Thessaly, Epirus, the islands and part of Asia Minor; while Albania would become an independent state; and Constantinople remain a free city.[54]

The last reference to the Greeks as potential members of the federation that Karavelov made was in the autumn of 1872, when he still asserted that only united in the Danubian federation, could the 11 million Slavs, 6 million Romanians, and 2 million Greeks be in a position to gain independence from the Ottomans, and confront the attempts of the European Powers to impose their terms on them.[55]

Even after having finally renounced the Greeks, Karavelov continued to support his federal model until the autumn of 1874, when he stopped publishing his political newspaper Nezavisimost.[56] Although he still insisted on a Bulgarian, Serbian, and Romanian cooperation, actual references to the Danubian federation, which he sometimes called Eastern of South-Slavic federation, became much less frequent.[lvii] Karavelov felt all the more disappointed as day-by-day he realized just how difficult it was for his plan to be implemented. On August 1874, bitterly he admitted that the Slavs sought help in the wrong direction, disregarding their natural brothers and allies. He was genuinely concerned about what miseries might befall them and the future generations, and concluding in a rather oracular tone claimed the Devil himself was not able to solve their problems.[lviii] A month later reporting on the then current situation in the Balkans he wrote: ‘honest people, who love their nation have a duty to prepare the revolution that is essential, in order to establish the basis for the common welfare of the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula. But is this revolution being prepared? Have the South-Slavs and the Christians in general reached an understanding about their activities? Has the essential plan been drawn? Boldly, we can answer in the negative.’ [lix]

Finally, when in 1876, on the eve of the Russo-Turkish war, Karavelov again resumed his position as newspaper correspondent, he made only occasional reference to the co-operation of the Slavs and refrained completely from reverting to his federation theme.[lx]

One further important issue that warrants discussion is Karavelov’s views on the federation’s relations with Russia. In his proposal, Karavelov always sought Russian aid and protection. He was convinced that on account of their relative ties, the Slavs should turn to this Slavic and Orthodox state for support. However, he soon realized that on many occassions, Russian policy did not meet the expectations of the South-Slavs and the Bulgarians. He thus took to criticising Russia for its political decisions whenever the opportunity arose. In 1870, for example, his personal evaluation on the Bulgarian ecclesiastical issue was that the Russian interventions had had a detrimental effect on the Bulgarian cause.[lxi] In 1871, he urged the Balkan peoples to count only on themselves and to not under any circumstances, expect foreign help. Writing as though a Russian was addressing the South Slavs: ‘Russia is the first state that should feel sympathy for you and help you, because you and we are two nations which belong to the same race and have the same religious faith; but Russia has its own interests, which do not coincide with yours, consequently any aid should make you suspicious.’[lxii] In 1874, Karavelov was displeased with the Russo-Turkish conciliation, even though he was sure that it was only temporary. ‘We are completely convinced that Russia cannot be unfriendly towards us, and that the Russo-Turkish friendship will not last for long’.[lxiii] Finally, in yet another article of the same year, Karavelov stipulated the terms for Russian friendship and assistance. Russia should not subordinate the Balkan peoples as she did the Poles and the Belorussians. She should come to the Balkans as a liberating force and not as a conquering autocratic power, because the Slavs wanted to be free and independent. Only under such conditions could Slavic brotherhood be established.[lxiv]

 

Conclusions

1. Karavelov envisaged a two-stages plan for the restructuring of the political status of the Balkans. The first phase foresaw a common revolution of the Balkan peoples in order to abolish the ‘Tukish yoke’, and the second, the formation of a free federal state. However, the main underlying objective of his proposal was the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule and the foundation of an independent Bulgarian state. ‘I am first of all a Bulgarian and then a Slav and a human, consequently the welfare of my own people should be given first priority’ he plainly declared in a letter addressed to Ivan Kishelski in 1870.[lxv]

2. Karavelov believed that a federal political organization was the best option for the future of the Balkan peoples for the following reasons: (i) it best served the Bulgarian national aspirations, (ii) only such a strong political union could easily and more effectively counter the attempts of the European Powers to exert their control on the Balkans, and (iii) it was the only way to settle the Macedonian dispute.

3. For Karavelov the mode of governance of the federation was essential. He condemned monarchy and tyranny and every kind of absolutist and autocratic regime. Adopting the new ideological trends initiated by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, he considered of the utmost importance that the governing system was based strictly on liberal principles, i.e. liberty, equality and brotherhood ensured by a constitution and safeguarded by a Supreme National Assembly expressing the will of the people. However, it is not clear if he completely rejected constitutional monarchy taking into account his offering the supreme leadership to whoever managed to solve the Eastern Question. Moreover, Karavelov stressed that each member-state should enjoy complete internal autonomy in order to be able to preserve its distinct national and cultural identity. His model was developed on the examples of Switzerland and the United States of America. In this way, Karavelov aimed to combine nationalism with federalism.

4. Although Karavelov stood firm on the ideological framework of his political union, he was not as decisive on the issue of the participants. At first (1867-1869), he propagated the establishment of a South-Slavic federation consisting of two sections: the Serbian that included Montenegro and the Slavs of the Habsburg Empire, and the Bulgarian. He rejected the idea that the Serbians and the Bulgarians should form one nation.[lxvi] Later, in 1869-1872, he added two more members, the Romanians and the Greeks, calling the union the Danubian federation. Soon after however, in 1873, he excluded the Greeks as he considered them to be enemies of the Slavic world. His criticism of them was on account of: their adherence to what they viewed as their historical rights, their laying claim to the territories of Macedonia and Thrace, their support of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, their seeking to subordinate the neighbouring nations, and for their hatred against the Slavs and the Romanians.[lxvii] In addition to the Greeks, Karavelov was also disillusioned with the Serbians and the Romanians for their policies.

5. Karavelov’s attitude towards Western Europe was hostile, because he believed that the latter opposed the Slavic interests. He was favorably inclined towards Russia and relied on her aid and support. Although he did not determine the exact nature of Russian involvement, he made it clear that he did not mean annexation to the Russian Empire.

6. Karavelov did not present his federal theory in one specific written work. On the contrary, his views are scattered in the articles he published in various newspapers over a period of about eight years. In spite of some obscurities and inconsistencies, his proposal is the most detailed and the most complete in comparison to all others purporting the federal idea in the 19th century.

7. Karavelov was mainly influenced by the left-oriented trend of federalism espoused by Russian and Serbian thinkers, such as Herzen, Bakunin and Markovich, whose ideas he had the opportunity to be acquainted with during his stay in Moscow and Belgrade. Karavelov adopted only their concepts for revolution, abolition of autocracy, and the formation of a Balkan federation on a democratic basis. He did not share their socialist inclinations for social reform. In this sense, Karavelov does not belong to any particular school of political thought, but rather blazes his own trail along three fundamental lines: revolution, federation, and liberal rule.

 

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